

Military and Control of Land Resources: Conflict TNI and Magelang City Government

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Abstract

The military's involvement in power and land ownership often leads to conflicts, both vertically and horizontally. According to the Agrarian Reform Consortium's records in 2020, agrarian conflicts involving military personnel during the Covid-19 pandemic were relatively stagnant. This paper aims to explore the conflict between the TNI Akmil Magelang and the Magelang City Government. The method used in this study uses a descriptive qualitative approach. Data collection techniques in this study using observation and documentation techniques and processing research data using the stages of data presentation, verification, and concluding. This study uses [Pondy's \(1967\)](#) theory regarding the stages of conflict as an analytical tool. The results show that the military conflict over land control with the city government has occurred since 1985. However, this conflict has not yet found common ground. The peak of the conflict occurred in mid-August 2020 when the TNI put up a sign at the mayor's office complex. The TNI gave an ultimatum to the Magelang City Government to leave or compensate for land assets. The development of the conflict is currently heading towards conflict resolution. However, it does not mean that in the end the conflict resolution can be found. This departs from the historical record where this conflict has been going on for a long time, and various parties as mediators are involved. However, the conflict continues to roll on and at any time can explode again in public.

Keywords

control land; military conflict; conflict resolution

Introduction

During the 1970s and 1980s, more than thirty countries in the world underwent a transition from an authoritarian political system to a democratic political system ([Huntington, 1991](#)). This was followed by Indonesia, where after the fall of the Suharto regime, there was a massive transition in changing the Indonesian political system. Various adaptive policies towards a democratic government are a space to reorganize a centralized authoritarian political system towards democratic decentralization. It started from the policy of regulating the military to return to the barracks, a more equitable government structure, even to the realization of democratic values that move from a centralized authoritarian concept to democratization ([Carothers, 2002](#)). However, this change still leaves a relatively complicated problem where the change does not entirely solve the agrarian problem ([Rachman, 2014](#)). This is reflected in the many conflicts both vertically and horizontally caused by agrarian problems. The state, in this case, is considered to have failed in distributing resources fairly and even not fulfilling the mandate of the 1945 Constitution article 33 paragraph 3 ([Astuti, 2011](#)).

The constitution explains that the state controls the earth and water and all the natural wealth they contain and is solely used for the prosperity of the people. The fact is that in the agrarian sector, conflicts are still quite complicated to be resolved ([Fahrimal & Safpuriyadi, 2018](#)). The purpose of this article is to analyze the conflict over ownership of land assets involving the Magelang Military Academy and the Magelang City Government. This is interesting because the vertical conflict has occurred since 1985 and has not yet met a meeting point or alternative conflict resolution. The involvement of the Military

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Academy with the City Government of Magelang, where both are actors working on behalf of the state and fighting over assets owned by the state, is undoubtedly an added value in understanding the conflict map between the two. Of course, a conflict between state servants in ownership of state land assets should be quickly resolved through a state approach. Ironically, this conflict occurred from the Suharto regime and has not been resolved to this day. On the one hand, the transition has opened up unprecedented freedom, giving them for the first time a choice to elect their leaders and the liberty to organize themselves in the way they prefer (Ghoshal, 2004). However, at the same time, the conflict situation is getting more acute, and even the calculations are increasing in escalation.

Along with the fall of the Suharto regime, the conflicts that occurred in Indonesia became wider because they were triggered by the destruction of various conflict management institutions, both owned by the civil community and the state (Lay, 2009). Even agrarian conflicts also experienced an increase in the graph after the New Order (Ahmad, 2014; Sandi, 2018). The involvement of military personnel in agrarian (land) conflicts is a small part of the portrait of the post-New Order conflict. As a defense and security actor, the state should guarantee and provide broad access to implement tasks that support national defense. However, what often happens is that the military as a defense apparatus is trapped in an unproductive conflict. The state is overcoming conflict issues involving the military apparatus slowly, and until finally, the military has created its own conflict space and is free from state control. Agrarian conflicts involving the military, for example, have occurred in Morotai Island Regency. This conflict involved the Indonesian Air Force and communities in five villages (Totodoku, Wawama, Pandanga, Darame, Gothalamo).

Based on the news at kabarmalut.co.id stuck out in the mass media, which eventually created a commotion and public polemic (Nurdin, 2020). The perception of land ownership triggered this conflict. In addition, the local government's slow and indecisive response has triggered this conflict on the other hand. The impact of this conflict is that investors are afraid to invest in the area because of resistance from the people of the five villages. Conflict resolution is difficult to achieve because the local government is not severe in mediating, reconciling, and bridging the two. Even the policies taken by the Morotai Island Regency Government are biased towards the elite and do not touch the lower classes (Qodir & Lesang, 2014). Departing from the conflict, that needs to be underlined, to get to the transition from conflict to resolution, there is no automation and effort is needed (Wohlfeld, 2010). The reality of the conflict has not yet been a serious effort from the local government in resolving the conflict.

The same thing happened in Malang Regency, where the conflict involved the TNI-AD Puskopad (Army Cooperative Center) with farming communities in Harjokuncaran Village (Purnomo, 2021). A sense of ownership triggered this conflict from both of them for land rights. The peak of the conflict occurred when the farming community of Harjokuncaran Village, Malang, held a demonstration demanding land ownership rights to the Army Cooperative Center (Indonesian: Pusat Koperasi Angkatan Darat, abbreviated as TNI-AD Puskopad), which resulted in the death of the peasants. The peak of the conflict occurred because of the slowness and unresponsiveness of state institutions, in this case, the National Land Agency, and the Malang Regency Government. This institution was weak and indecisive until the conflict led to clashes between the two. However, the conflict found common ground, namely conflict resolution by giving land ownership rights to members of the farming community in Harjokuncaran Village (Rusdi, 2019). The two conflicts involving the military apparatus have a similar pattern that causes the conflict to experience a peak of tension between the actors involved. Weak state institutions that cannot mediate conflicts between the two become the dominant factor that causes the conflict to move further from conflict resolution.

Conflicts involving military personnel also occurred in Kebumen Regency. The object of conflict between the community and the TNI in Setrojenar Village, Buluspesantren District, is a land dispute and occurred in 2015. This area became part of the conflict with the Urut Sewu area of Kebumen (Cahyati, 2013; Putra et al., 2014; Susanto, 2019). The conflict was caused by differences in claims for defense areas and weapons testing from the TNI, who used coastal areas, and farmers felt that they had claims to use these areas as areas that PAL Budeg could plant. Since the conflict could not be resolved by the two of them, the Kebumen Regency Government formed an independent team to find alternative solutions to the agrarian conflict on the 14th of September, 2015. Even the team formed by the state institution involved universities such as UGM, College of Land, BPN Pusat, BPN Kebumen, and the District Government itself.

The follow-up to the conflict was that the independent team asked both parties to provide original data and documents on the land so that from these documents and data, the independent team would make a decision ([Wijayanti, 2015](#)). This third study tends to show where state institutions are present in resolving conflicts involving farmers and the TNI. It can show how the steps and responses of the Kebumen Regency Government are trying to bring a third team towards conflict resolution.

Finally, the agrarian conflict involving the military also occurred in Aceh. The case is no joke where the agrarian conflict involved the Aceh Regional Government and the TNI-AD C.q. Kodam Iskandar Muda as the main actors. The conflict has occurred since 2013 is fighting over land ownership rights in Blang Padang, both of which do not have a land certificate as the object of the conflict ([Fajar, 2016](#)). Agrarian conflicts do start from mutual claims between various actors. All parties feel they have and want to gain access to agrarian objects ([Wahab, Nur, & Melamba, 2017](#); [Zulkifli & Zuska, 2020](#)). Therefore, it is not surprising that in an agrarian conflict, one of the actors will feel frustrated, anxious, and worried if he does not get his wish, and there are disturbances created in realizing his desire ([Thomas, 1992](#); [Willson & Feinstein, 1987](#)). As a result, the situation became disconnected and forced both parties to create conflict to have access to existing agrarian lands.

Based on the four studies that all involve elements of the military apparatus, the difference from this research is that it seeks to examine agrarian conflicts that both involve state servants, namely the Military Academy and the Magelang City Government, with a very long duration of time. This conflict involves actors who are both state institutions, namely the military and civilians. Therefore, this research becomes essential in examining how conflicts involving fellow state institutions and how this conflict is still deadlocked. The author formulates the problem that will be answered in this study: how to map land ownership conflicts involving the Military Academy and the Magelang City Government? In addition, the readers also want to see how far this conflict has led to conflict resolution and what steps have been taken to reach that stage?

Agrarian Conflict

Soil is a resource that has unique characteristics compared to others. [Kurningsih & Purwoko, \(2004\)](#) mentions that land has a significant meaning where everyone who owns land will tend to try to defend their land in any way and strategy if other parties violate their rights as owners. Tjondronegoro & Wiradi in ([Qodir & Lesang, 2014](#)) mention that if land becomes an object unique in nature, it is needed by many people, but the number does not increase (fixed). An inner relationship cannot be separated between land and humans or is called a magical religious character, viewed from the cultural side. This is a strong reason why land is one part of the type of resource that is always busy, causing conflicts either individually with individuals, individuals with groups, or groups with groups. The nature of the conflict presented by land objects also varies, both vertically and horizontally. Agrarian conflicts usually begin with symptoms of inequality (incompatibilities).

Wiradi said that in Indonesia, there are at least three kinds of incompatibilities, namely: (a.) Inequality in terms of "ownership" and "land tenure" structures; (b.) Inequality in terms of "allotment" of land; and (c.) Incompatibility in terms of perceptions and conceptions of agrarian. These three inequalities trigger an increasingly massive agrarian conflict. In the context of agrarian conflicts involving the military, both dealing with local governments and local communities, it tends to describe an inequality based on land ownership or control. The military will usually win the struggle for property rights between the military and the community. This means that local governments tend to give massive access to the military as fellow state servants.

Agrarian conflicts are usually a manifestation of gaps in perceptions and preferences of the parties involved in the conflict. The existence of orientation from each party to acknowledge each other and claim that the conflicting parties feel they have rights to the object in dispute is the complexity of the conflict. Therefore, when each party is still strong in their sense of belonging, the conflict will peak. This means that before one party lowers the tension of the conflict, the conflict will automatically escalate, and the result can lead to a violent fight.

Conflict Resolution

Wohlfeld has explicitly stated that conflict will not automatically reach a point of resolution if there is no effort to reach it. This means that what [Wohlfeld, \(2010\)](#) said wanted to give a valuable lesson that nothing is instant without going through hard work and a long process. A resolution will be achieved if there are efforts from each conflicting party to mutually dialogue with each other to find alternative ways that are acceptable to each party. Conflict resolution is part of an effort to end disputes between several parties in the activities of human social life. Resolution is a way to unravel the roots of the source of conflict by building new relationships with conflicting groups or parties that can last a long time ([Miall, 2002](#)).

Meanwhile, the forms of conflict resolution also have many variants. It was starting from forms that are only short-term to forms that can be long-term. Harjana (in [Kurningsih & Purwoko, 2004](#)) suggests that each party can use five ways to manage a conflict. The first is to compete. This method aims to see which actor dominates so that the winning party must force the weak side. This typology is the face of a conflict approach on a win-lose basis. This means that each party is satisfied with the results decided. On the other hand, some parties are disappointed with the results set.

The second is by synergizing and collaborating, and conducting confrontation. This means that each party to the conflict is committed to jointly finding the best solution to both parties to the conflict. This method is a win-win approach. It is based on an acceptance between parties, and neither party is let down. Third, it can be done by way of compromise and negotiation. This conflict resolution approach shows that there is neither a winner nor a loser in the resolution of a conflict.

Fourth is by avoiding or withdrawing. Both parties are not serious in defending their respective interests, and even their conflict does not draw attention to the conflict in question. The last is by adjusting, softening the conflict, and obeying. This means it becomes part of a lose-win approach. Conflict occurs through several stages in the stage of a conflict. Pondy said about "The Dynamics of a Conflict Episode" in which he divided the stages of conflict into five essential parts, namely: latent conflict (conditions), perceived conflict (cognition), felt conflict (affect), manifest conflict (behavior), and conflict aftermath. (conditions) ([Pondy, 1967](#)). The stages proposed by Pondy sequentially want to show conflict patterns from the emergence of conflicts to the point of resolution. Pondy said in the parts of the stage that it is enough to see a conflict that occurs with the symptoms he is experiencing. This means that using the Pondy theory tool and it can show how far the conflict has gone.

Methods

This type of research uses a qualitative approach. The reason the author uses this approach is that a phenomenon can be explained in detail and in-depth. In addition, it is also able to collect the required data in a complex manner. The data obtained is vital in the analysis process so that, in the end, it produces specific results. The method used is descriptive with the aim that the author can systematically describe the facts and characteristics of the object under study appropriately. In general, this research depends on the ability of researchers to make observations on the object of research. This is related to the final result that can present its uniqueness and distinguish it from previous research ([Rahmat, 2019](#)).

This research uses the literature study method in obtaining relevant data from journals, books, scientific articles, and other references related to the topic. The data collection process is carried out systematically so that the analyzed data can provide answers to the problem formulation and produce conclusions. Using literature studies in the data collection process in this study is because reference sources are not limited to time and space. This makes it easier for the author to know the phenomena that occurred in the past. Based on the qualitative approach, four stages start from data collection, data reduction, data presentation, and concluding ([Dull & Reinhardt, 2014](#)).

The first stage makes the writer look for data from several sources, either in writing or images. At least four previous studies describe the involvement of agrarian conflicts in the control of land resources. Both the Army and the Air Force are essential in how the military creates space for conflict vertically. For example, the agrarian conflict on Morotai Island with Indonesian Air Force actors dealing with the community showed that the local government was not firm and serious in finding a resolution to the

conflict. As a result, the conflict lasted for a long time. Meanwhile, the pattern repeats in the conflict involving the TNI-AD Puskopad with farming communities in Harjokuncaran Village, Malang Regency.

The local government is also considered not to be serious in mediating the conflict. Meanwhile, a different pattern occurred in the agrarian conflicts that occurred in Setrojenar, Buluspesantren, Kebumen. The conflict that occurred in Kebumen was precisely the local government present and trying to resolve the conflict. The last conflict occurred in Aceh, where the case involved the local government with the TNI-AD Cq Kodam Iskandar Muda in 2013. Based on the four previous literature pieces, this research's novelty is to dig deeper into the agrarian conflict that occurred in Magelang City because the case has since 1985. It is important to analyze why this conflict has been going on for decades and has not been resolved. The categorization of data used in this study is to use secondary data.

Through secondary data, researchers can examine and analyze information from various media, journals, books, and so on to find in-depth analysis. Furthermore, in the second stage, the writer must select and sort the data into special categories or according to the theme raised. The secondary data that will be analyzed to see the agrarian conflict involving the military in Magelang City is through the mass media, statements and actions taken by the conflicting parties, the history of the origin of the conflict, the causes and effects of the conflict, and reports from the KPA (Consortium Agrarian Reform) on the conflict. Then proceed with the process of presenting the data to produce conclusions. The last stage allows the author to conclude continuously (Rijali, 2019). The research locus chosen by the author is a land ownership conflict involving the Military Academy and the Magelang City Government. There are two reasons for this case as the locus of research. First, this conflict is a long-standing case since 1985 and has not yet been resolved. Even the two parties involved are fellow state servants, both military and non-military. Second, this conflict should be resolved in the state's realm because the actors involved are state institutions. Therefore, it is crucial to conduct a case study.

Results

Conflict is part of the catalyst for change. Without change, an organization will not survive well (Robbins, 1978). What was conveyed by Robbins could provide a view that the conflict involving the military wanted to create a change, namely "clarity of land ownership". Without conflict, land ownership will not become apparent, and who owns the ownership rights of the land. The 2020 Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA) report in this pandemic era alone noted that there were 241 agrarian conflict eruptions in 359 villages/villages involving 135,337 families with a total of 624,272,711 ha of conflicted land. Compared to 2019, which was 279 conflicts, this number is still considered stagnant or only decreased by 14% (Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, 2020).

Table 1. Agrarian Conflict Frequency by Sector

No	Sectors	Frequency
1	Plantation	122
2	Forestry	41
3	Infrastructure	30
4	Property	20
5	Mining	12
6	Military Facilities	11
7	Sea Coast	3
8	Agribusiness	2

Source: [Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, \(2020\)](#)

Looking at the Consortium for Agrarian Reform data, the eruption of agrarian conflicts is still relatively high. This high agrarian conflict in Indonesia has become the most excessive conflict (Adiansah, Nulhaqim, & Basyar, 2021). As recently, agrarian conflicts also occurred in Magelang. The conflict in Magelang became a very long conflict because it had been going on since 1985. This conflict only emerged violently in July 2020 and shocked the public. The public indeed wonders from 1985-2021 what has been done by the City Government of Magelang with the Military Academy? Why does the conflict still look

calm and has only recently emerged violently? Therefore, in mapping and answering the formulation of the problem, the author will describe the phases of the conflict presented by Louis R. Pondy. Pondy said about "The Dynamics of a Conflict Episode" in which he divided the stages of conflict into five essential parts, namely: latent conflict (conditions), perceived conflict (cognition), felt conflict (affect), manifest conflict (behavior), and conflict aftermath (conditions) (Pondy, 1967). Through these stages, the author will analyze using cases of land ownership conflicts in the Magelang City Government.

Latent Conflict (Conditions)

Pondy explained that three main bases characterize this stage (latent conflict). The three include competition for scarce resources, the drive for autonomy, and differences in sub-unit goals (Pondy, 1967). This stage emphasizes if the conflict is still hidden, which then becomes the seed of conflict as an implication for the connectivity of individuals or groups that are still struggling under the surface. This can be seen in the conflict over land ownership by the Magelang City Government. The Magelang City Government currently occupies the land or assets in conflict as a complex for the City Government Office and the DPRD Office. It can be seen from the dynamics of its history, which began in 1982. The Commander General of the TNI Academy, Lt. Gen. TNI (Mar) Bambang Suswanto, explained that the commands' office AKABRI (Indonesia's military school), which is currently used as an office complex for the Mayor of Magelang, was built in 1982, and the construction was completed in 1985. Previously, the construction was intended as the headquarters of the commands' office AKABRI in Magelang. However, the TNI Commander ordered that the commands' office, AKABRI office, not be in Magelang and be moved to Jakarta. Realizing that the administration was not good at that time, the Ministry of Home Affairs at that time, namely Suparjo Rustam, ordered the Magelang City Government to occupy the assets of the commands' office AKABRI which had been completed on a land of about 40,000 square meters. Previously, the Magelang Mayor's office was located in the Magelang City Square area, currently used as the Magelang City PDAM office.

In reality, the transfer of assets from the Minister of Defense to the Ministry of Defense to the City Government of Magelang does not have a valid official report and does not involve the commands' office AKABRI, who is the owner of the assets. This situation seems to continue from time to time. This means that from the side of the Magelang City Government itself, it does not think about the validity of the occupied land and does not anticipate the impacts that arise in the future. Magelang City Government has been occupying assets freely for years. Even though the land occupied is still a polemic. The Magelang City Government has held meetings and coordinated on land assets, but it has not reached a common ground. From 2011 until now, at least nine meetings have been held, but the results are still not finalized. This condition continues as a routine that does not produce results. As stated by Pondy, that different goals can create conflict. However, if we look closely at the routines established between the City Government of Magelang and the Military Academy as a form of communication between them, they are going well even though they are actually in conflict. As a result of this communication, it becomes a form of relationship that shows that the level of conflict is still below the surface. There has been no natural reaction and response from one of the parties that shows a dominant claim. Therefore, this situation becomes the seed of conflict still under the surface and is just waiting for time to pass. There are times when these seeds will erupt in various forms that can produce either a win-win solution or a zero-sum game between the actors involved.

This latent conflict stage provides at least two different views, both from the Magelang City Government and the Military Academy. First, from the perspective of the City Government itself, they occupy this asset freely without thinking about legality, legitimacy, black and white, as an order from the Ministry of Home Affairs. As a result, the City Government complies with the assets they occupy as their bureaucracy is still not resolved. Meanwhile, from the Akmil side, it seems that they did not oversee this conflict from the beginning so that in the early days, the conflicts that involved them were still hidden and were still in a situation where there was no visible conflict. Although in reality, this conflict has begun to be resolved with the impression that there is no conflict between the two. This is what Pondy became the seed of conflict that could erupt at any time.

Perceived Conflict (Cognition)

This stage explains that conflict begins to be conceptualized and perceived. The actors involved in the conflict try to start perceiving conflict situations in this stage. How do they see a conflict that involves them, see how much urgency the conflict issues they face, make opinions on the motives and positions of the opposing group. Between each conflicting actor creates conflicting initial assumptions, as happened in the conflict between the Military Academy and the Magelang City Government. If it is analyzed more deeply, how each actor constructs perceptions can be traced from the position of the disputed land object. The case of land objects, which began in 1985, indirectly has slowly built up perceptions of conflict. The Magelang City Government conceptualizes the problem of land objects as something delicate. The order of the Minister of Home Affairs mandates the City Government of Magelang to occupy land assets and buildings that were built since 1982 and completed in 1985 as if the City Government had given up on the historical situation. This is on the side of the Magelang City Government that requires a strategic central government location. Also, the Magelang City Government forgets the historical aspect that the building they occupy as a government complex is very luxurious.

In addition, the military academy also conceptualizes this land conflict from a different perspective. It will take more or less three years to build a building on a land asset of 40,000 square meters. However, the land and building assets were smoothly transferred to the Magelang City Government quickly. This condition is the basis for the conception of the conflict from the Military Academy that began to take shape. Land and building assets legally and legally belong to the Military Academy. Therefore, this is a strong basis if the Magelang City Government wants to control land and building assets. The government also must pay the compensation fee. The conflict has been well-conceived but has not been shown with a responsive attitude on either side.

Based on the news in the mass media on the 6th of July 2020 at [antaranews.com](https://www.antaranews.com), the Magelang City Government must immediately return the stolen assets (Suyitno, 2021a). They occupied for years. From the media above, it can be understood how the Military Academy started to determine the perception of conditions in viewing the ongoing conflict. The shadow is that if the Magelang City Government does not have a good intention to compensate for the land and building assets it occupies, then the conception will be built. Some thoughts and feelings grow to restore what they have. The author would like to say that the pressures made by the Magelang Military Academy in responding to conflicts over land and building assets are the fruit of an old perception that has been built up.

Therefore, conflict perceptions will always grow and develop until, in the end, one of the parties will show their character reactively to the object in question. Administratively, the City Government building complex is essential in supporting the performance of local government administration. However, they also need buildings and land as a place for them to work in the community. A large number of SKPD units will undoubtedly add to the complexity of space and building requirements. Therefore, because they work on behalf of the public and serve the people, it is also necessary to review how this asset conflict can hinder service performance. The origin of this land has become conflict wherefrom the government itself from the beginning this problem arose there was no serious effort to find a solution. It took years for this conflict to just roll on in the community and create public boredom to resolve the problem immediately.

Felt Conflict (Affect)

Pondy emphasized that during this time, conflict began between each of the opposing actors. Each conflict actor realizes the conflict that they experience and feel emotional experiences, such as frustration, anxiety, anxiety, and similar feelings. This is driven by the demands between each actor where there is an awareness of the actors that must be fought for the agenda. There is a feeling and fear if the goal will fail or be hampered by the other party. On the other hand, the conflicted actors realize that they have a position that is believed to be accurate, so they will continue to fight for it. This is also reflected in the conflict involving the Magelang City Government with the military academy. Each party realizes that there are different interests between the two. However, these different interests stand in the same forum, serving the community and working for the state.

The Magelang City Government realizes that government administration needs strategic land and

buildings in moving the regional SKPD units to work professionally. Therefore, the Ministry of Home Affairs' order to occupy the commands' office AKABRI since 1985 in Magelang is an opportunity to show that that is where the center of government is running and running. The City Government will see if the placement, which the Ministry of Home Affairs instructs, must last a long time or even forever. This is based on the assumption that the center of government is permanent and not easy to move. Especially if it is already in a very strategic place for the sustainability of its governance affairs. However, this is why the local government turned a blind eye to the land they occupy. The problem has not been resolved.

From the point of view of the Military Academy, of course, they also realize that they legitimately have power over the land, assets, and buildings currently occupied by the City Government of Magelang. On the same side, when the land for building assets was occupied by the City Government of Magelang from 1985-2021, they began to think progressively about the future of their rights. They will openly use the assets as an office for the Magelang TNI Academy, considering they currently do not have good places and facilities. The enthusiasm of the Military Academy party was also triggered by the findings of the BPK RI data in 2011, and other parties also used the assets in the name of the Military Academy. Of course, the BPK, in this case, questioned the transparency and accountability of the military academy as to why this could happen.

Therefore, at this stage, it can be seen that the awareness that arises from each of the conflicting actors cannot be separated from the achievement of their goals and also their belief in their goals. This conflict clearly shows that legally the building asset land occupied by the Magelang City Government belongs to the Magelang Military Academy. However, since the beginning of the City Government itself, there has been no serious effort and intention to resolve this problem so that this becomes a conflict that continues to regenerate regional leaders. More than 20 years of ongoing conflict is enough to prove that there is no commitment to the spirit and effort to solve this problem. Therefore, it is very natural that the TNI Academy can at any time bring up and take over its rights, even by force. This is indeed a legitimate legal right and has shown that whatever happens, the land of the building assets belongs to the TNI Academy. No wonder if this is not resolved, it can lead to new conflicts at any time.

Manifest Conflict (Behavior)

In this stage, one of the parties or even each of the conflicting parties openly faces the opposing group. The reactions of each actor, of course, also vary. The level of conflict also determines it and what kind of conflict is experienced to explain this stage in the conflict of land and building assets occupied by the Magelang City Government, where the Magelang Military Academy is a very active actor in carrying out reactions to the conflicts that occur. It can be seen how, with the strength of its personnel, the Military Academy wants to immediately take over its rights which the Magelang City Government currently occupies. The reaction was openly carried out by installing stakes and signposts in the area of the Magelang City Government while confirming that the land occupied by the Magelang City Government was the chosen land of the Military Academy. This also informs the public that they know that the conflict involving the Magelang City Government and the Military Academy has not been resolved.

The news on the 3rd of July, 2020 accessed at jateng.antaranews.com showed several TNI academies led directly by the Chandradimuka Regiment Commander TNI Academy Colonel Pas Tri Wibowo pegged and put up a sign on the 3rd of July, 2020 (Suyitno, 2021b). The Military Academy's installation of the signs and stakes was carried out, which wants to emphasize its commitment to resolve the conflict that has arisen immediately protracted. The sign reads, "This land and building belong to the Ministry of Defense and Security CQ. commands' office AKABRI/TNI Academy based on SHP no 9 of 1981 IKN no. 2020335014, a land area of 40,000 square meters". The reactions taken by several members of the Military Academy were a result of the protracted conflict. Previously, it should also be noted that this reaction did not appear suddenly.

The Magelang Military Academy has repeatedly given the Magelang City Government a choice to resolve this issue. For example, the Commander General (Indonesian: Komandan Jenderal, abbreviated as Danjen) of the TNI Academy, Lt. Gen. Mar Bambang Suswanton, insisted on urging the Magelang City Government to move from his office location. The Magelang City Government also previously held various meetings involving all parties from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the province,

the TNI Commander, military academy, and other parties; one big statement emerged: land compensation leaving the office they currently occupy. If the government compensates for a land area of 4,000 square meters, the City Government must prepare a budget of 200 billion rupiahs. Of course, this first option will not be done because the City Government alone does not reach that much revenue. If the second option is carried out, the administration of City government affairs will be disrupted, and as a result service cannot run optimally.

The choice given by the Military Academy to the City Government was indeed a very dilemmatic one. Nevertheless, the intense pressure from the Military Academy to take over the land-building assets was firm. The Damjen TNI Academy Mars Bambang emphasized that he would use their methods if the City Government did not immediately follow up on their warning. Using a gentle approach, the Military Academy has given them six months to one year to vacate the land assets and buildings they currently occupy. Even during the installation of stakes, all ASN parties in the Magelang City Government and the surrounding police were silent. This shows if one of the parties is starting to get cornered and can no longer provide resistance. In the end, all the land assets were pegged and put up by the TNI as a sign that they would immediately leave their assets.

Conflict Aftermath (Conditions)

This stage sees how conflict resolution works. How and to what extent the conflict resolution has been taken. The installation of signs and stakes is not a point of conflict resolution. After the TNI Academy carried out the installation of the stakes and signposts, it caused new internal conflicts. In this case, parties from the legislature and executive united to react to the actions of the Military Academy, which was very embarrassing in public. Therefore, this conflict is still ongoing and has not yet been resolved. However, in its development, the currently elected Mayor of Magelang commits to resolve this conflict. The intensive relationship between the Military Academy and the new Magelang City Government is currently well established due to the deteriorating condition of the previous one. In the development of this conflict, each party coordinated to resolve this inheritance problem immediately.

In the current situation between the warring parties, there are genuine efforts and approaches towards conflict resolution. The meeting evidences this after the land sign peg by the Military Academy. The new mayor who has just been elected realizes that conflicts over building land assets have been going on for a very long time. If it is allowed, this will be a legacy of conflict for the mayor who served. This condition is believed to be unsuitable for the continuity of the implementation of regional government affairs that have been running so far. Therefore Muchamad Nur Aziz, as the new mayor, was elected to take a stand so that this conflict immediately finds an alternative solution. Conflict resolution is an essential path for each actor. Without conflict resolution, a conflict will be protracted, and this can pose threats from various sectors. Therefore, conflict resolution does not occur automatically and requires strenuous efforts and strategies to get to this condition.

The news on Friday, the 23rd of April 2021, which was stated at republika.co.id, shows how conflict resolution between each actor begins to be felt (E. P. Putra, 2021). Even though the resolution has not been reached, the efforts to reach that resolution have already opened. Communication and coordination in conflict play a very vital role. Therefore, so that the solution produced between the TNI Academy and the Magelang City Government can produce decisions that do not harm each other, communication and coordination need to be built. If these efforts are carried out intensively, meetings and meetings are often held. This will be a perfect way for both of them to resolve the conflict.

Discussion

In this case, the involvement of the military apparatus, the TNI control land resources is nothing new. Even from various existing records, it is stated that military conflicts in the civilian realm over control of land access tend to increase. This trend shows that the involvement of the military and civilians to position themselves as the dominant actor in land access creates ambiguity in their function as state servants. The state of the Covid-19 pandemic that occurred in Indonesia even showed that military conflicts with both local governments and the community did not affect. Rationally, conflicts involving the military should have decreased significantly. This departs from a security perspective that the pandemic has created a threat to health, economic and social security for humans, so both the military

and local governments should work together to overcome the Covid-19 pandemic that occurred in Indonesia.

The report of the Consortium for Agrarian Reform in 2020 revealed that the military is an actor causing agrarian conflicts, which are face to face with both the community and local government. This conflict involving the military was caused by mutual claims over control over land assets. In the number of conflicts recorded in 2020, along with the Covid-19 pandemic situation, there were 11 conflict eruptions. At least two patterns can be studied in conflicts involving the military with local governments or local communities. This pattern is a reality that occurs in the field. If this military conflict is dealing with local communities, then there is a tendency for local governments not to be neutral and side with the military. This means that the military will control asset control conflicts. The second pattern is that if this conflict involves the military and is face to face with the local government, this conflict will last a long time. This was triggered by negotiations from both sides of fellow state servants. This negotiation will tend to be complicated even though both have resistance to control the disputed land resource conflict.

Conflicts involving the military and the Magelang City Government are only a tiny part in coloring the portrait of conflicts involving the military. This conflict has occurred since 1985 and until now has not found a standard conflict resolution. One of the objects disputed by civil and military actors is land assets and buildings, which are currently occupied as a complex for the administration of the City of Magelang. This means that various objects and bureaucratic buildings, be it the mayor's office, agencies, institutions, and DPRD offices, are the targets of conflict. This is indeed very dilemmatic considering that the disputed object is a vital object rather than the regional government administration office. Of course, to give these assets and buildings is not just like that. Legally and in black and white, this object is indeed an asset of the Magelang TNI.

The TNI took various steps and methods to urge the Magelang City Government to return its historically owned assets. Even at this point of tension, the TNI strictly gave two options to be implemented by the Magelang City Government. The first option is that the Magelang City Government must be willing to compensate for the land and building assets they currently occupy if they want to continue to carry out their state duties. The second option is that the Magelang City Government must leave its place if the first option is not implemented. In this second option, the TNI still provides flexibility in the time to move, which is six months to 1 year to prepare everything. The two options given by the TNI seem to be the fruit of hope for the Magelang City Government. This means that the Magelang City Government cannot compensate the land and building assets because the Magelang City Government's income is insufficient to cover the compensation costs. In addition, the Magelang City Government is also reluctant to move because the area, which is currently the Magelang City Government complex, has become a central area for the people of Magelang City. After the peak of the conflict, the Deputy Commander General of the TNI Academy, Marsda Sri Pulung, met the elected Mayor of Magelang to follow up on the conflict.

Based on this description, it can be seen how the negotiations that have developed between the two conflicting actors tend to be just a formality. There are no decisions made from the meeting that have been explicitly followed up. This is a critical note that the commitments that should have been made have been ignored. The transition from conflict to resolution is not automated and requires effort (Wohlfeld, 2010). Wohlfeld wants to emphasize that no conflict will lead to a resolution without the maximum efforts of the conflicting actors. There must be a cost to be paid to lead to conflict resolution. According to Wohlfeld, the cost is the commitment of each conflict actor to agree to resolve the conflict jointly. Considering that the conflict has been going on for quite a long time, it can be said that each party does not have serious intentions and actions to resolve the conflict immediately. Of course, this condition will lead far to the point of conflict resolution. The further away from conflict resolution, the more acute and complex a conflict will be. This, of course, will be ineffective and inefficient for the survival of the conflicting parties.

Learning from the agrarian conflict involving the military in Magelang, it is increasingly clear that there are two fundamental reasons why this agrarian conflict always arises. These two are land administration issues and land use issues (Adiansah et al., 2021). If traced by land administration in the context of the conflict over military land assets in Magelang, it is still unclear. From the very beginning, the land and

building assets were indeed owned by the Magelang Military Academy. This is evidenced by the confirmation of BPK's findings on TNI assets, whose use is always questioned. However, at the same time, the Magelang City Government occupied the land and building assets on orders from the Ministry of Home Affairs at that time. Therefore, in terms of land administration, in transferring building land assets from the TNI under the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Magelang City Government, there is no clear administrative accountability and transparency. Even the military itself admitted that the delegation was not involved in the meetings and discussions.

This is very ironic because the TNI as the rightful owner must also be involved in its delegation. So that both parties are equally clear and coherent in the transfer of these assets, on this basis, the actual conflict has become more and more protracted. The second basis is the agrarian conflict caused by the asset utilization factor. In terms of asset utilization, it is not too dominant to trigger conflicts that occur. However, more or less, these factors also contribute to creating conflict. When examined further, this conflict in terms of asset utilization is also a problem. The Magelang TNI also needs these assets considering Magelang City is the center of military training. Even in August 2021, it is planned that TNI Magelang will hold primary education for TNI and Polri soldiers every year. At least this event will be attended by 1000 soldiers. Of course, this requires a place as a logistics storage and lodging arena for participants. This is the reason that they need the place for their needs. This is very commonly done if there is a pressing need, then the actor will seize and create access as the owner.

Conclusion

Based on the analysis of agrarian conflicts in this case and building assets involving the TNI and the Magelang City Government, it can be concluded that this conflict has not yet passed the conflict phase that Pondy conveyed perfectly, namely latent conflict (conditions), perceived conflict (cognition), felt conflict (affect), manifest conflict (behavior), and conflict aftermath (conditions). The latent conflict stage is shown by the transfer of land and building assets to the Magelang City Government without involving the TNI as the owner of the assets. Of course, the situation creates the seeds of conflict that are still below the surface. This means that the silence of the Magelang TNI as the owner of assets in the transfer of land assets from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Magelang City Government at that time has framed conflicts that will arise at any time.

Of course, this is very reasonable because, as the owner of land and building assets, it is necessary to have good agreement and coordination so that conflicts can be avoided. Therefore this stage is obvious in this conflict. The second is the stage of perceived conflict, where each party begins to conceptualize the conflicts that arise between them, as with the conflict between the TNI and the Magelang City Government, which the TNI conceived as the owner of land and building assets. The TNI began to conceptualize that the TNI itself should occupy the building land assets occupied by the Magelang City Government since 1985 as the owner. Therefore, the initial concept that emerged was how the efforts should be made by the TNI so that they could occupy the land and building assets. This is the conception of conflict built from within the TNI before giving birth to concrete action.

Next is the felt conflict stage, where each party begins to realize and feel what they should get. The TNI is undoubtedly starting to feel that building and land assets as owners need to be reacquired. This is also driven by the perception of the TNI itself that they also really need these assets and buildings to support their military activities. This stage begins to be seen if there have been efforts to get to a point called to action and real action. The TNI has just built a collective awareness of the object of the conflicted land before giving birth to act as a response to opponents of the conflict that have opposite objectives. Fourth is the manifest conflict stage, where each conflict actor shows the other's actions and reactions. This means that the conflict actor responds to the conflict in this phase by taking action against the opposite actor. TNI Magelang, in this conflict, used concrete actions in which personnel were deployed to install stakes and signposts in the office complex and bureaucracy in Magelang City as the object of the conflict. This is to confirm if the building land assets they currently occupy are theirs and should be returned. The last is the conflict aftermath phase, where at this point, conflict resolution has begun to be achieved. However, in the context of the TNI conflict in Magelang, this stage was not fully realized. This means that there is a big enough failure in getting to the aftermath of conflict. This can be seen from the period and the course of this conflict. From 1982, 1985 until 2021, the conflict has not found

an explicit agreement. Even in mid-July 2020, the conflict reached a climax. The long journey of the conflict that took decades shows that there have been failures between each conflicting party.

Given the length of time this conflict has been going on, and there is no severe alternative from each party, the recommendation from this research is that it is necessary to involve actors outside the conflicting parties. This is important because the mediator actor will be a catalyst and accelerate the situation in ending the conflict. The central government, be it the National Land Agency, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Commander of the TNI, and the Provincial Government even involve academics so that they can sit down together and be serious about finding a middle way in ending the long journey of the conflict. Their involvement becomes a very urgent matter because if the mediator is not involved, the conflict will only become more massive and worsen.

In addition, the following recommendation is that each party must be able to find an agreement that is oriented towards a win-win solution. This means that the final decision can be reached from them alone so that neither party feels disappointed or disadvantaged. It is crucial to find a long-term conflict resolution point not to reappear the seeds of conflict. The final recommendation for this conflict is that the parties to the conflict should understand their position as state actors. The TNI as a military actor and the Magelang City Government as a civilian actor must respond to this conflict with the spirit of conflict resolution. No matter how complicated the problem is, of course, it must be traced and a way out of the state approach as well. This conflict resolution will be completed if using a country-based approach. This is because the two actors involved are both actors in the state area. In addition, the assets contested generally belong to the state, so the state approach has a fundamental level of urgency to end this conflict.

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